

# **Managing Multi-Sided Conflicts: Failed Military Intervention and Mediation in Yemen**

*Juliana Beal*

Washington University in St. Louis

## **Abstract**

*In the last twenty years, international efforts to improve peace prospects in Yemen have failed across commitment levels. Yemen's historically weak government and large number of rebel groups have fueled commitment concerns, increasing negotiation difficulty. This paper will leverage Yemen's conflict trajectory to expand upon past international conflict management research, including the effect of risk aversion and divergence ratios in Stephen Gent's *Going In When It Counts* and *Strange Bedfellows*, respectively. In addition, this analysis demonstrates how inopportune military intervention, divergent major power interests, Qatar's failed pure mediation dynamics, and poor representation in peace agreements have led to unsuccessful resolution.*

## Introduction


The Houthi overthrow of the Hadi government, violence from Islamic extremist groups, and strengthening Southern Separatist movement have fueled a multi-sided civil war and a devastating humanitarian crisis. Yemen's history has been tumultuous, evidenced by the 1994 Civil War, protests prompting the removal of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, and 2015 Houthi overthrow of the Hadi government ("Yemen Fast" 2020). This instability has left a fragmented country, as political and territorial fighting exists between the Hadi government and a multitude of rebel groups. Two particularly powerful rebel groups include the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the Houthis. The STC is a secessionist party, as tensions between North and South Yemen have been longstanding. For example, fragmentation led to first Yemeni civil war in 1994, sparked by continued marginalization of the South, including assassinations of politicians, a constitution proposal that decentralized power, and northern exploitation of Southern resources (Day 2010). The Houthis, a Zaydi group, oppose Saleh due to his corruption and monetary greed as well as Saudi Arabia and the United States for their support of Saleh (Riedel 2017). In addition to these rebel groups, financial and military backing from Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Iran has only increased the complexity of the conflict and turned the fighting into a proxy war. Saudi military intervention as well as Qatari and Gulf Cooperation Council mediation did not resolve the Yemeni conflict, begging the question: *why did international conflict management efforts fail in Yemen?* These attempts at conflict resolution were largely unsuccessful due to inopportune military intervention, competing major power interests, failed pure mediation, and lack of representation in peace agreements; however, recent peacebuilding efforts have reduced violence.

## Saudi Military Intervention

### *Timing of Military Intervention*

The timing of foreign military intervention affects victory prospects as well as government legitimacy. In *Going in When It Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts*, Stephen Gent argues, “intervention is most likely when one side is not significantly more powerful than the other” (Gent 2008: 720) to “have the greatest marginal effect on producing a more preferred outcome” (714). Gent posits that intervention is motivated by utility maximization, as intervention occurs when the marginal benefit is the greatest. To apply this model, Gent requires that third parties must exhibit self-interest and a desire for control over policy preferences. King Salaman altruistically states, “Our standing by Yemen was not an option but a duty to support the Yemeni people in confronting the aggression of Iranian-backed militias” (Kalin 2018). However, Saudi human rights violations, such as air strikes (“Saudi-led” 2019) and port blockades, violate the “right intention”

Figure 1. Relative Army Capabilities



principle of the Responsibility to Protect<sup>1</sup>

(Evans 2002: 4) and suggest a primary motivation to reduce Iranian power within the region (Abdul-Ahad 2018). In Gent’s model, the probability of intervention occurs at the point of intersection of rebel and state capabilities. Gent uses troop size

<sup>1</sup> Responsibility to Protect is an international promise to prevent inaction in the case of a human rights violation. The doctrine employs six criteria to ensure this agreement is not exploited, including, “1. the just cause threshold, 2. right intervention [also referred to as the “right intention”], 3. last resort, 4. proportional means, 5. reasonable prospects, and 6. the requirement of right authority” (Evans 2002: 1). The “right intention” principle states that the primary motive of an intervening nation “must be to half or avert human suffering” (4)

to measure capability<sup>2</sup>. Ranges of Houthi army size estimates were averaged to determine army capability values<sup>3</sup>. Therefore, Gent's theoretical model predicts Saudi intervention would have occurred in 2013, the point of intersection of rebel and government capabilities.

Gent's model correctly identifies the inopportune timing of Saudi intervention. While Gent defines intervention as "convention-breaking" and "authority-oriented" (Gent 2008: 715), Pearson and Baumann provide a more operational definition, citing intervention as "the movement of troops or forces of one country into the territory [...] of another" (Pearson 1988). In employing the latter definition, Saudi Arabia responded reactively in 2015 to the worsening conditions in Yemen, such as the weakened government from Saleh's 2011 removal from office and Iranian military assistance to the Houthis. The U.N. Security Council Iran Sanctions Committee reports, "Iran probably started providing small amounts of weapons to the Houthis in 2009" (Juneau 2019), as an Iranian ship with anti-tank weapons was seized that year (Dorell 2015). Additionally, in 2013, the U.S. Navy seized "forty tons of military supplies intended for the Houthis" from Jihan 1, an Iranian dhow, and gained intelligence on Houthi training programs conducted by Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Alasrar 2019). Yemen reports identified one missile as "the Iranian-made Misagh-2 surface-to-air missile [, which ...] would reflect a significant increase in lethality for the insurgents," suggesting heightening capability (Shanker 2013). Despite information on strong rebel capability from the Saada Wars and credible signs of increasing Houthi power through Iranian alliance, Saudi Arabia intervened only after Hadi was overthrown by Houthi forces and requested military intervention from the Arab League, Gulf

---

<sup>2</sup> Gent's model fails to consider strategy effectiveness and technology as supplemental measures to military strength, as well as the effect of the political environment on government resolve (Reiter 2009: 11). While Gent's "measure of rebel troop size does not vary over the course of the conflict," the Houthi dataset does account for these changes, increasing accuracy by adding a temporal dimension (Gent 2008:723).


<sup>3</sup> For example, in 2017, officials used frontline deployments to estimate 180,000 to 200,000 Houthi soldiers, which was averaged to 190,000 in the *Relative Army Capabilities* graph (Mansour 2019). Linearity was assumed between unknown points due to lack of data availability.

Cooperation Council, and the UN Security Council (Carboni 2019). In addition to the loss of legitimacy due to the military coup, “by calling for Saudi intervention, Hadi lost what he still had in terms of legitimacy and trust throughout the country,” proving the plea itself also signalled the state’s true weakness (Transfeld 2019b). This delayed government-biased intervention and public display of instability reduced peace prospects significantly by intensifying national fragmentation, as a rise in the number of rebel groups increases conflict duration and reduces the probability of resolution by negotiated settlement (Cunningham 2016). In December 2014, after the Houthi takeover of Sanaa, “Separatists argue[d] that recent events are further evidence that they cannot tie their political future to the north” (Alley 2016) and refused Hadi’s call for military unity among anti-Houthi forces (Al-Batati 2018). Hadi’s lack of political leverage lead the Southern Separatists to pursue their own agenda through military force and reject a peace-improving alliance. Similarly, religionist rebel groups (Fazal), such as Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State in Aden and Abyan, exploited this power vacuum to make territorial advances (Transfeld 2019b). Along with seizure of government buildings, AQAP formed strategic tribe alliances and faced minimal resistance to territory acquisition, as the Houthis, AQAP’s regional enemy, were “preoccupied with battles against rival militias across the country” (Al-Batati 2015). Therefore, the large number of competing groups necessitated prioritization of resources and subsequently a less concerted effort at targeting these weaker extremist groups. In addition to increased terrorist gains, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter says, “it’s easier to do our counterterror operations when there’s a settled government,” demonstrating how the instability not only increased terrorist capabilities but also

reduced international ability to combat this surge in power (Al-Batati 2015). This reactive call for government-biased intervention hindered national unity, government credibility, counter-terrorism efforts, and general peace prospects.

While Gent's model accurately identifies the reactive nature of Saudi intervention, it fails to account for the high degree of risk aversion exhibited by both governments and government-biased interveners. While marginal utility increases as rebel and government capabilities approach equivalency, the risk of rebel victory also increases. Governments are likely risk-averse institutions due to the extreme consequences of loss, such as the difficulty to redeem legitimacy after a coup, the violence from power vacuums, and political fragmentation with the Yemen conflict. As seen by the risk aversion function, any risk-averse agent suffers a loss of utility from the risk of defeat and would likely pay a premium to avoid the possibility of a complete loss of power. Therefore, the utility-maximizing point likely occurs before the equivalence point for government-biased intervention. In addition, as heightened rebel capability increases the probability of rebel-biased intervention and subsequently the chances of a rebel victory, informed government-biased interveners may be even more inclined to intervene prematurely (Gent 2008: 720-721). While this addendum to Gent's theory would likely maximize utility, the 2015 Saudi intervention occurred reactively, suggesting resource maximization and risk-aversion are likely not the primary motivators for international conflict intervention.

Figure 2: Risk Aversion



## Alliances in Military Intervention

The probability of intervention and commitment to the conflict are heavily influenced by alliances. The Saudi-led coalition's military response to the 2015 Houthi overthrow suggests regional alliances limit the free-rider problem. In *Strange Bedfellows: The Strategic Dynamics of Major Power Military Interventions*, Gent argues, "if states agree on an issue, they have incentives to free ride and let other states bear the costs of intervention" (Gent 2007: 1089). Five of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait, demonstrated shared interests through issuance of a joint statement to the Security Council, citing the Houthi coup as "a major threat to the security and the stability of the region, and a threat to international peace and security" ("Statement" 2015). However, the varying degree of military intervention among these members supports the existence of the free-rider problem. While Saudi Arabia supplied one hundred fighter jets and the UAE supplied thirty jets, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar supplied fifteen, twelve, and ten, respectively, suggesting the latter countries shirked responsibility<sup>4</sup> (Gambrell 2015). However, Hadi's direct call on the GCC and the member's desire to maintain their reputation and membership to the group heightened accountability, likely increasing involvement. GCC membership has benefits, such as military backing from the Peninsular Shield Force ("What" 2017) and a joint goal of economic diversification predicted to increase regional growth ("GCC" 2018). Hadi also called on the Arab League and the United Nations (Carboni 2019). While both groups have more members, the degree of military assistance was significantly lower. Four of the twenty-two members of the Arab League contributed to the coalition, as support from Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco ranged from verbal

---

<sup>4</sup> However, alternative reasons for lesser military involvement may include lower percent of GDP as military expenditure, as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain reported 13.326%, 5.008%, and 4.633%, respectively, with no reports from UAE or Qatar in 2015 ("Military" 2018). Saudi Arabia may show greater willingness to intervene due to geographical proximity, as the nations share a border.

support to four fighter jets, providing collectively less assistance than the GCC (Gambrell 2015). Similarly, of the 193 United Nations members, only the United States and Pakistan demonstrated interest, providing intelligence and verbal support, respectively. The results show a progressive decreases in military support correlates strongly with an increasing organization size. However, this calls for greater academic research as to the validity of this correlation in other conflicts. If proven true, then, Gent's concern of inaction can be mitigated by increasing reliance on smaller coalitions to reduce the dissolution of responsibility.

### **Interest Divergence in Saudi Military Intervention**

In addition to alliances, interest divergence also induces intervention. However, while the Saudi and Emirati desire for regional control led to military involvement, this misalignment hindered peace prospects, as power clashes reduced anti-Houthi progress. In *Strange Bedfellows*, Gent argues, "a state is more willing to join an intervention as its preferences with the initial intervener diverge" (Gent 2007:1089). Gent uses the Correlates of War (CoW) dataset to determine major power standing, which granted status to the United Arab Emirates and excluded Saudi Arabia (Maoz 2016). Since the CoW contributors "have become even less confident of our major power classifications, especially [...] since 1965," as there is concern if "we have entered a period dominated by major regional powers," the validity of this measure proves poor (Maoz 2016). In addition, both the Independent (Baker 2018) and U.S. News & World Report rate Saudi Arabia above UAE for power, suggesting the seven major powers listed on the CoW data may not be a comprehensive list <sup>5</sup> ("The 80" 2020). Therefore, low confidence in the measure and the existence of other sources questioning

---

<sup>5</sup> COVID-19 may hinder the global standing of both Saudi Arabia and UAE, countries whose economies rely heavily on oil production. In addition to the recent OPEC deal "to cut production by 9.7 million barrels a day in May and June," barrel prices have plummeted and are predicted to recover to about 2/3 of the January 2020 price by the end of 2022 (Arezki 2020).


the ranking suggests Saudi Arabia's likely status as a major power, allowing for application of Gent's model.

Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have desires for territorial gain and regional power. Saudi Arabia used the conflict to justify gaining coastal access, as Saudi deployments "match the incense trade route" from the Indian Ocean ("Saudi Arabia" 2018), and the occupation of Yemen's southern provinces, such as Hadramwt, Shabwah and Mahrah provinces (Younes 2019). In addition, long-running tensions with Iran for regional control prompted intervention to "counter the threat of Iran and the expansion of Shiism in the Gulf" (Darwich 2018). Similarly, the UAE secured Aden and southern ports to "enhance the position of its own port at Jebel Ali [...] by stifling competition or directing traffic in its direction" ("Saudi Arabia" 2018). Since UAE views Saudi-backed Islah as similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, a regional enemy, the ideological divisions lead to support of differing factions with a shared anti-Houthi aim (Byman 2019).

However, proxy war engagements prove more difficult than direct intervention due to an increase in the number of party interests and a reduction of control over armed forces. The Saudi Arabia-backed Hadi government and Islah rebel group began combating directly with UAE's secessionists and Salafists (Byman 2019). This division was intensified in 2017, when Hadi removed Aden's governor, sparking the emergence of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). In addition to STC's 2018 seizure "of most of Aden from ROYG [Yemen government] troops in just three days" and the government palace in 2019 ("Battle" 2019), fighting broke out between the Saudi-backed Islah party and the UAE-backed Abu al Abbas brigades (Sharp 2019). Therefore, desires for regional control and support of competing rebel groups substantiate Gent's argument of diverging interests prompting intervention.

However, this interest divergence proved detrimental to peace prospects, as fragmentation among anti-Houthi groups hindered government legitimacy and military capabilities. Since the STC takeover of Aden reduced the presidency to “a holding vehicle for state legitimacy (rather) than based on the practicalities of governance,” Emirati military support for the STC contributed to the increasing ineffectiveness and instability of the ROYG, an avid and direct opponent of the Houthi

Figure 3



(“Sites”)

rebels (“Separatists” 2019). In addition to military prowess, STC’s strong governing capability also undermined state legitimacy, as “residents on either side [of the conflict] say they feel safer” under STC control (“Victory” 2018). These reports suggest a government failure to effectively protect its own citizens. This Aden takeover supports Hartzell’s argument that the existence of a “paralyzed, weak state” is “likely to result in conflict-creating outcomes,” as “social actors feel compelled to take

action to rectify an unsatisfactory situation” (Hartzell 2001:185). The STC’s relatively superior peace-enforcing capabilities increased unrest; groups began to recognize the state’s weakness and seek to advance their own interests. This STC-ROYG feud has increased fragmentation, as “tribal leaders are exploiting the chaos” with some claiming to represent duwailat and creating a new council lead by the self-declared Sultan of Mahra and Socotra (“Saudi Arabia” 2018). The violence between anti-Houthi groups reduces probabilities for success on their shared interest. Given “the STC in the south and the Houthis in the north, Saudi Arabia [representing the ROYG] would lose the war,” suggesting divergent interests with the UAE resulted in lower success for the Hadi government

and Saudi Arabia, a partner in the fight against Houthi aggression (Transfeld 2019a). Therefore, while divergence on regional power and rebel party backing prompted military intervention, these conflicting interests both hinder peace prospects due to fragmentation and reduce the probability of anti-Houthi victory, as the conflict proves damaging for both government legitimacy and military capability.

Peace prospects are directly correlated with the relative priorities of the shared and divergent interests of the two competing major powers. Intensity is a scalar quantity defined as the willingness and dedication to achieve a specified goal. If both the intensity of the divergent interest (DI) and


shared interest (SI) are calculated, the higher the SI to DI ratio, the more resources are allocated to the SI.

Assuming the DI is primarily motivated by self-interest while the SI reflects a peace-inducing desire, this higher ratio signifies less progress for the DI and an increase in overall peace. If this ratio is low, as in

the case with Yemen, military intervention may not be an effective conflict management strategy, rather a platform to advance the interests of other nations and heighten national instability. The difference between the success along the consensus dimension suggests increased divisiveness of the DI results in less peace gains, as seen by revised graphics from Gent's *Strange Bedfellows* (Gent 2007:1091). Therefore, while Gent's model accurately predicts the probability for major power intervention increases with greater divergence, the success of intervention in achieving peace


(Gent 2007, p. 1091)

Figure 4a:  
2:1 SI:DI ratio for both nations



- $\pi_1$  1's ideal policy
- $\pi_2$  2's ideal policy
- $\pi_J$  Joint intervention policy
- $\pi_Q$  Status quo policy
- $r_1$  Relative power of 1

Figure 4b:  
1:2 SI:DI ratio for both nations



- $\pi_1$  1's ideal policy
- $\pi_2$  2's ideal policy
- $\pi_J$  Joint intervention policy
- $\pi_Q$  Status quo policy
- $r_1$  Relative power of 1

depends largely on the relative priorities of the shared and divergent interests, as competing along the divergent dimension reduces progress toward immediate peace.

## **Mediation**

### *Qatari Mediation*

In addition to failed military intervention, mediation efforts prove a recurrent strategy within Yemen's conflict management trajectory. In June of 2007, Qatar sent "a foreign ministry delegation with hired Yemeni facilitators to negotiate with Houthi leaders" and mediated a ceasefire agreement to end the fourth phase of the Saada wars (Barakat 2014). The agreement mandated rebel disarmament of "heavy weaponry to the government," which would leave Houthis vulnerable to attack and shift the balance of power heavily in favor of the government (Al-Haj 2007). The disarmament was not supplemented with an immediate political power-sharing condition to reduce commitment concerns, rather expulsion of rebel leaders and further limitations on expression. The agreement required leaders to "refrain from political and media activities against the Yemeni government" during their temporary exile to Doha (Al-Haj 2007). Although the Yemeni government promised the Houthis "their own political party after peace returns," the lack of an immediate and guaranteed political power-sharing provision increases commitment concerns, as future political expression is contingent on the government's definition of peace and dedication to the agreement (Sudam 2007). Since "each additional dimension of political power-sharing reduces the risk of settlement failure by about 29 percent" (Mattes 2009: 754), failure to fully institute these measures likely increased the intensity of commitment problem for rebels, as the fighting resumed "only months later" (Salmoni 2010). The government was unable to destroy the Houthi's base and leadership during this fourth phase of the war, despite "unleashing all its force" and ruining its "own

international image,” proving Qatar should have instituted more rigorous political-power sharing in the agreement to reflect the true balance of power between the two groups (Salmoni 2010).

In 2008, Qatar also mediated the Doha Agreement failed, yet again, to include power-sharing provisions to reduce commitment concerns. In addition to rebel disarmament and requiring the government to “release prisoners, grant amnesties, and to reconstruct war-torn areas,” Qatar provided political asylum to rebels as well as \$500 million in “reconstruction assistance for Saada Province” (Palik 2019). The agreement lacked territorial power-sharing provisions by calling for an “extension of the state’s general order [...] in the region” (Salmoni 2010). While Mattes finds territorial power-sharing has positive correlation with settlement success, Walter (2002) as well as Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) find direct causality, suggesting Qatari neglect of instituting these provisions to reduce the commitment problem (Mattes 2009: 754). Both ROYG and Houthi rebels displayed strong distrust, as Houthis “worried that if they g[a]ve up their weapons and prisoners first, they w[ould] be attacked” (Ghobari 2008). In addition, the agreement required amnesty and a release of prisoners; however, the ROYG referenced historical commitment problems, such as “a state amnesty that freed 600 rebels in 2006 [that] failed to end the revolt” (Ghobari 2008). This reciprocal distrust reduces peace prospects, as both parties fear shifting the balance of power to their opponent and losing their military leverage.

In addition to the lack of power-sharing provisions, Qatar failed to build trust between Houthis and the ROYG to solve these commitment concerns. Qatar held pure mediator status, “lack[ing] the financial leverage of Western donor countries” and the “influence of Saudi Arabia, [...] a significant military power” (Barakat 2014). In fact, while Qatar attempted to provide economic incentives for peace by financing the Saada reconstruction (Palik 2019), the disagreement over the extent of Saleh’s control over the funds resulted in Saleh deeming the mediation a “failure” and

Qatari removal of all aid, proving a lack of substantial economic leverage to incentivize peace (Barakat 2014). As a pure mediator, Qatar was tasked with gaining party confidence, retaining image, improving communication, and cultivating “social ties” (Svensson 2007: 229). However, after the initial ROYG and Houthi meeting, Houthi leaders “refused to attend subsequent meetings in Doha” due to Qatari mediation, suggesting inability to establish credibility in initial meetings and sustain communication (Kamrava 2011). Concerns about Qatar’s affiliation with Iran fueled distrust. Yemeni parliament member Muhammad Bin-Naji al-Shayif declared Qatar as, “mere messengers from Iran in a desperate attempt to rival the Saudi position in the region” (Kamrava 2011). While power mediators can encourage action through the use of leverage, a pure mediator’s main asset is its ability to address the foundational problems between countries, requiring trust and receptibility to be effective. This concern was intensified by Saudi efforts to weaken Qatari influence to “counter a potential rise in Qatari soft power in its southern neighbor” (Kamrava 2011). Saudi media “portrayed Qatari intercession as guided by Iran [... and] poured ‘money into the Yemeni military and allied tribes’” to further offset the balance of power from the original Doha Agreement (Kamrava 2011). Saudi Arabia acted as a spoiler to the Qatari mission by preventing success in relationship building to undermine the reputation and credibility of Qatar. Instead, since the Doha Agreement lacked both political and territorial power-sharing measures, the combination of Saudi power mediation and Qatari pure mediation would likely have increased the probability of parties signing a pact with these provisions (Svensson 2007: 242), decreasing the risk of settlement failure (Mattes 2009: 754). Qatar’s perceived lack of neutrality hindered its legitimacy as a mediator, suggesting the self-interested motives of spoilers can diminish receptibility to third-party involvement and mediation.

### *Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative*

After Qatari mediation, the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative created a framework for the transitional government. Two elite parties, the General People’s Congress and the Joint Meeting Parties, orchestrated this agreement, excluding both the Houthis and Southern Movement (Transfeld 2019b). A Southern Separatist leader noted, “if you demonstrate that you are strong enough to fight and cause trouble, you get a place at the table [...] The Houthis learned that lesson and we resisted it” (Salisbury 2016). The exclusion of relatively less violent parties positively reinforced the use of violence as a strategy to gain political power, as groups that posed a greater threat gained a platform to increase their legitimacy through government recognition and heightened negotiating power. Selecting parties for negotiation based on violence level suggests a causal mechanism for Nilsson’s finding that, “if an agreement excludes one or more rebel groups, the risk of post-settlement violence involving either signatories or non-signatories increases by 84%” (Nilsson 2008: 489). An inclusive peace agreement may discourage violence by reducing the correlation between a party’s status as a relative threat and attendance at negotiations. This subsequent use of “violence as a political tool” suggests a need to correct the reward structure of the country, potentially through cost-increasing provisions to punish violent acts (Salisbury 2016).

In addition, while Nilsson defines inclusion as holding signatory status in a peace settlement, this interpretation fails to address intra-party fragmentation and the representativeness of the signatory as additional barriers to agreement receptibility. While the GCC Initiative’s National Dialogue Conference included the Southern Movement, the “southern representatives who attended the NDC were out of touch with the demands of a new generation and, therefore, lacked legitimacy, particularly after many southern delegates were appointed by President Hadi” (Sharp 2019).

Representatives with misaligned agendas reduce the strength of an agreement and increase the risk

of renegement. Therefore, in addition to general inclusivity, signatories must also represent their party to ensure both acceptance and commitment to the agreement.

## **Peacebuilding**

Yemen's conflict management trajectory continued with the United Nations' Stockholm Agreement, which instituted a peacebuilding mission to address the stalemate in Hudaydah. The United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) is an observation mission that "oversee[s] the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces, and mine action operations" ("UNMHA" 2019). While peacekeeping proves a conflict management strategy, peacebuilding is utilized for conflict resolution, "preventing a relapse into violent conflict" (Coning 2018). Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali established the Agenda for Peace to standardize the conflict management and resolution process, requiring peacebuilding after the creation of a peace agreement, deployment of a peacekeeping mission, and an end to fighting. While peacebuilding is designed for post-conflict societies, Yamani, Yemen's Foreign Minister at the time, rejected peacekeeping entirely, resulting in premature peacebuilding efforts to increase stability without immediately threatening governmental power ("Yemen's Saudi-Backed" 2018).

Although Fortna's *Does Peacekeeping Work?* does not extend to peacebuilding missions, UNMHA addresses similar causal mechanisms to peacebuilding missions, such as increasing peace benefits and reducing risk (Fortna 2010: 102). UNMHA altered war incentives by providing humanitarian assistance, including a mission that "demined and removed obstacles to allow the passage of a multi-agency humanitarian team -- to the Red Sea Mills, where 51,000 metric tons of grain are stored, enough to feed more than 3.7 million people for a month," providing access to the facility for the first time in over a year (Guterres 2019). Since Yemen is facing the world's worst

humanitarian crisis and the battles waged near the ports of Hudaydah have significantly reduced access to necessary aid, gaining access to food sources is a reminder of the benefits of a peaceful society and motivates local support of peace initiatives (“The World Bank” 2019). UNMHA also reduces fear through a partnership with the Redeployment Coordination Committee, consisting of both Houthi and ROYG representatives tasked with “building relationships with and confidence between the parties” (Guterres 2019). The Committee and UNMHA share a unified agenda to ensure communication and reduce potential abuses. While peacekeeping missions facilitate communication by “inform[ing] each other about their intentions,” peacebuilding efforts address more foundational issues and establish a higher degree of trust to foster a lasting relationship and address commitment concerns (Fortna 2010: 95). UNMHA also reduces uncertainty by developing frameworks and proposals to the operations behind redeployment and demilitarization efforts (Guterres 2019). Peacebuilding holds a greater mediatory role, rather than the active presence of peacekeeping troops dedicated to monitoring disarmament and demobilization (Fortna 2010: 94). Therefore, peacebuilding missions address similar causal mechanisms to peacekeeping by altering incentives for war and reducing fear.

Similar to peacekeeping, peacebuilding missions also select into conflicts with poor peace prospects. Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that peacebuilding takes “place primarily in post-conflict settings,” where nations “were starting almost from ground zero, under clouds of bitterness and loss,” suggesting the difficulty of the task and situation<sup>6</sup> (“Peace-building” 2001). The Stockholm Agreement showed low probability of implementation and periods of rejection, which increased commitment concerns and reduced the credibility of future negotiated settlements. Less than a day

---

<sup>6</sup> Peacebuilding missions have occurred in Cambodia, El Salvador, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Central African Republic, Liberia, Haiti, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique (“Peace-building” 2001).

after the agreement was signed, both Houthis and government loyalists “accused each other of violating a ceasefire” in this city, demonstrating a high degree of distrust between the two parties (“Yemen’s Warring” 2018). These commitment concerns are heightened by Hudayah’s strategic value, increasing each party’s desire for a decisive victory to claim ownership. A ROYG takeover would prevent Houthi’s access to “valuable customs revenues and an arms smuggling hub” (“Saving” 2019). In addition, governmental seizure would “break the image of the Huthis’ military superiority in the north, thereby harming the group’s ability to recruit among the tribes” and increase the government’s bargaining power (“Saving” 2019). Despite the United Nations’ acceptance of Houthi unilateral redeployment, the Hadi government deemed this effort “a free service to the Huthis” (“Crisis” 2019), suggesting discontent in Houthi military recognition and legitimacy (“Saving” 2019). Hadi also developed a “maximalist interpretation of the accord” and demanded that “all Huthi personnel are to be replaced by government forces” (“Saving” 2019). As unsuccessful peace agreements increase peacekeeping likelihood, the past failures of the Doha Agreement and GCC Initiative as well as poor receptibility to the Stockholm Agreement highlight this similarity among peacebuilding missions (Fortna 2010: 42). The prolonged war duration, the immediate conflict after signage of the Stockholm Agreement, the importance of the disputed good, and past peace agreement failures suggest peacebuilding also selects into difficult conflicts.

Peacebuilding proved effective in Yemen. In June of 2019, the United Nations reported a significant increase in stability after UNMHA implementation, such as “a decrease in the number of reported civilian casualties, a growing number of returnees to the area and more observed economic activity” (Guterres 2019). However, while peacebuilding can improve peace, it does not necessarily ensure peace, as “indirect fire and sniping” still “persists in the main hotspots” (Guterres 2019). Since peacekeeping missions “reduce the risk of another war by 55%-60%” (Fortna 2010: 173) and

UNMHA, as a peacebuilding mission, proved independently successful, further research is necessary to determine if United Nations adherence to Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace of supplementing peacekeeping with peacebuilding would produce a synergistic effect in improving peace prospects (Coning 2018).

## **Conclusion**

While UNMHA has proven effective, the Yemen Crisis trajectory has suffered from inopportune military intervention, divergent major power interests, Qatar's failed pure mediation dynamics, and poor representation in peace agreements. In addition, Yemen lacks female representation in political decision-making; despite a thirty percent quota, no women are represented in parliament (Bar 2019) and only three women have taken part in Yemen's past three peace talks (Nasser 2019). This deficit is reflective of the greater gender inequity of Yemen, as, "for more than a decade, Yemen has been the lowest-ranking country in the Global Gender Index" (Nasser 2019). This loss of human capital prevents Yemen from benefiting from risk reductions to conflict recurrence due to women's increased focus on social welfare programs and positive effect on governmental credibility (Shair-Rosenfield 2017: 1).

Between the end of 2019 and beginning of 2020, conflict management regressed, suggesting the volatile nature of the conflict and tendency of all parties to renege on previous promises. Events in late 2019 provided hope for future peace, such as Houthi's release of 290 prisoners in September 2019 ("Houthis" 2019). While this represented only a fraction of the UN mandated prisoner-swap initiative, the credible signal of voluntarily shifting the balance of power suggested increased commitment to peace and dedication to the Stockholm Agreement. In addition, the November Riyadh Agreement utilized political power-sharing provisions by creating a new cabinet with an equal

number of seats between Hadi and STC representatives (Shaker 2019). Therefore, the alignment of major powers, inclusion of fear-reducing provisions in future peace agreements and demonstrating government commitment by implementing past agreements provided a foundation for improving the conditions. However, recent events in the spring of 2020 suggest a loss in progress. Despite both a United Nations plea for ceasefire and Saudi-UAE declared ceasefire with Houthis due to the COVID-19 pandemic, fighting persisted. Houthi spokesman Mohammed al-Bukhaiti reported continued Saudi-Emirati efforts to uphold blockade and stated, "We will continue to fight and target their military installations and industrial sites since they continue with the siege," suggesting a strong distrust and lack of commitment on both sides ("Saudi-UAE" 2020). In addition to continued Houthi fighting, the STC movement also created further division within the country. Without support from southern authorities, the STC declared both a state emergency and self-rule in the south, citing the Hadi government's "corruption and mismanagement" as motivation ("Yemen Southern" 2020). This declaration opposes on the Riyadh Agreement, "further heightening tensions among ostensible allies in the Saudi-led coalition battling Houthi rebels" ("Yemen Southern" 2020). Given the deterioration of the Riyadh agreement, Saudi Arabia and the UAE must resolve their proxy war to prevent further violent fighting between the Hadi government and STC. In addition, heightened commitment concerns with the Houthi rebel group are reflective of a history of renegeing on previous agreements and overall government weakness, exacerbated by the STC-Hadi conflict. Given this multi-sided conflict, it becomes imperative to reduce the interest divergence as well as reprioritize intervention for the means of preventing human rights violations, not further destabilizing Yemen.

## Work Cited

“The 80 Most Powerful Countries in the World.” *U.S. News & World Report*, U.S. News & World Report,

[www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/power-rankings](http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/power-rankings).

Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith. “Yemen on the Brink: How the UAE Is Profiting from the Chaos of Civil War | Ghaith

Abdul-Ahad.” *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 21 Dec. 2018,

[www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/21/yemen-uae-united-arab-emirates-profiting-from-chaos-of-civil-war](http://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/21/yemen-uae-united-arab-emirates-profiting-from-chaos-of-civil-war).

Al-Batati, Saeed, and Kareem Fahim. “War in Yemen Is Allowing Qaeda Group to Expand.” *The New York*

*Times*, The New York Times, 16 Apr. 2015,

[www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/middleeast/khaled-bahah-houthi-rebel-yemen-fighting.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/middleeast/khaled-bahah-houthi-rebel-yemen-fighting.html).

Al-Batati, Saeed. “Yemen Resistance Divided over Joining Hadi's Army.” *Yemen – Gulf News*, Gulf News, 29

Oct. 2018, [gulfnews.com/world/gulf/yemen/yemen-resistance-divided-over-joining-hadis-army-1.1561801](http://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/yemen/yemen-resistance-divided-over-joining-hadis-army-1.1561801).

Al-Haj, Ahmed. “Yemen's Government, Shiite Rebels Negotiate End to 3-Year Conflict.” *The Seattle Times*,

The Seattle Times Company, 17 June 2007, [www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/yemens-government-shiite-rebels-negotiate-end-to-3-year-conflict/](http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/yemens-government-shiite-rebels-negotiate-end-to-3-year-conflict/).

Alasrar, Fatima Abo, and Ibrahim Jalal. “Iran's Role in Yemen and Prospects for Peace.” *Middle East*

*Institute*, Middle East Institute, 29 Oct. 2019, [www.mei.edu/publications/irans-role-yemen-and-prospects-peace](http://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-role-yemen-and-prospects-peace).

Alley, April Longley. "Yemen's Houthi Takeover." *Crisis Group*, Crisis Group, 4 Oct. 2016,

[www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-s-houthi-takeover](http://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-s-houthi-takeover).

Almasmari, Hakim. "Medics: Militants Raid Yemen Town, Killing Dozens." *CNN*, Cable News Network, 27 Nov. 2011, [edition.cnn.com/2011/11/27/world/meast/yemen-clashes/index.html](http://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/27/world/meast/yemen-clashes/index.html).

"Armed Forces Personnel, Total." *The World Bank*, The World Bank Group, [data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1).

Arezki, Rabah, Rachel Yuting Fan, and Ha Nguyen. 2020. "Coping with COVID-19 and Oil Price Collapse in the Gulf Cooperation Council." *World Bank Blogs*. World Bank Group. April 21. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/coping-covid-19-and-oil-price-collapse-gulf-cooperation-council>.

Baker, Sinéad. "The 25 Most Powerful Nations on Earth, Ranked." *The Independent*, Independent Digital News and Media, 9 July 2018, [www.independent.co.uk/news/world/world-most-powerful-countries-ranking-change-a8438711.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/world-most-powerful-countries-ranking-change-a8438711.html).

Bar, Zvi. "Yemen Came in Last of 146 Countries on Women's Rights. So the UN Gave It a Prize." *Haaretz*, Haaretz Newspaper, 15 Jan. 2019, [www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-yemen-came-in-last-of-146-countries-on-women-s-rights-so-the-un-gave-it-a-prize-1.6844136](http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-yemen-came-in-last-of-146-countries-on-women-s-rights-so-the-un-gave-it-a-prize-1.6844136).

Barakat, Sultan. *Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement*. Brookings Doha Center, 2014, *Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement*, [www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-English.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-English.pdf).

“Battle for Aden: Who Is Fighting Who and How Things Got Here.” *Al Jazeera*, Al Jazeera, 29 Aug. 2019, [www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/aden-clashes-fighting-190829145606437.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/aden-clashes-fighting-190829145606437.html).

Byman, Daniel. “Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates Have a Disastrous Yemen Strategy.” *Lawfare*, The Lawfare Institute, 31 Oct. 2019, [www.lawfareblog.com/saudi-arabia-and-united-arab-emirates-have-disastrous-yemen-strategy](http://www.lawfareblog.com/saudi-arabia-and-united-arab-emirates-have-disastrous-yemen-strategy).

Carboni, Andrea. “Special Focus on Coalition Forces in the Middle East: The Saudi-Led Coalition in Yemen.” *Aclcd Data*, 16 Apr. 2019, [www.aclcddata.com/2018/07/31/special-focus-on-coalition-forces-in-the-middle-east-the-saudi-led-coalition-in-yemen/](http://www.aclcddata.com/2018/07/31/special-focus-on-coalition-forces-in-the-middle-east-the-saudi-led-coalition-in-yemen/).

Coning, Cedric de, et al. “What Peacekeeping Can Learn from Peacebuilding: The Peacebuilding Dimensions of the A4P.” *IPI Global Observatory*, 29 June 2018, [theglobalobservatory.org/2018/06/what-peacekeeping-can-learn-from-peacebuilding-a4p/](http://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/06/what-peacekeeping-can-learn-from-peacebuilding-a4p/).

“Crisis Group Yemen Update #11 - Yemen.” *ReliefWeb*, OCHA, 16 May 2019, [reliefweb.int/report/yemen/crisis-group-yemen-update-11](http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/crisis-group-yemen-update-11).

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. *Oslo Forum Papers: Understanding Fragmentation in Conflict and Its Impact on Prospects for Peace*. 2016, *Oslo Forum Papers: Understanding Fragmentation in Conflict and Its Impact on Prospects for Peace*, [www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Understanding-fragmentation-in-conflict.pdf](http://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Understanding-fragmentation-in-conflict.pdf).

Darwich, May. “The Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Struggling for Status.” *Insight Turkey*, vol. 20, no. 2, 2018, pp. 125–142. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/26390311](http://www.jstor.org/stable/26390311).

Day, Stephen. *The Political Challenge of Yemen's Southern Movement*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010.

Dorell, Oren. "Iranian Support for Yemen's Houthis Goes Back Years." *USA Today*, Gannett Satellite Information Network, 20 Apr. 2015, [www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/04/20/iran-support-for-yemen-houthis-goes-back-years/26095101/](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/04/20/iran-support-for-yemen-houthis-goes-back-years/26095101/).

Evans, Gareth and Mohamed Sahnoun. 2002. "The Responsibility to Protect." *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec.

Fazal, Tanisha. 2018. "Religionist Rebels & the Sovereignty of the Divine." *Daedalus* 147(1): 25-35.

Fortna, Virginia Page. *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. Princeton University Press, 2010.

Gambrell, Jon. "Here Are the Members of the Saudi-Led Coalition in Yemen and What They're Contributing." *Business Insider*, Business Insider, 30 Mar. 2015, [www.businessinsider.com/members-of-saudi-led-coalition-in-yemen-their-contributions-2015-3](http://www.businessinsider.com/members-of-saudi-led-coalition-in-yemen-their-contributions-2015-3).

"GCC's Economic Diversification to Boost Foreign Investment and Non-Oil Trade, IMF Says." *The National*, The National, 8 Dec. 2018, [www.thenational.ae/business/economy/gcc-s-economic-diversification-to-boost-foreign-investment-and-non-oil-trade-imf-says-1.800346](http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/gcc-s-economic-diversification-to-boost-foreign-investment-and-non-oil-trade-imf-says-1.800346).

Gent, Stephen. 2007. "Strange Bedfellows: The Strategic Dynamics of Major Power Military Intervention." *Journal of Politics* 69(4): 1089-1102.

Gent, Stephen. 2008. "Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts." *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4): 713-735.

Ghobari, Mohammed. "Qatar Tries to Salvage Faltering Yemen Ceasefire." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 4 May 2008, [www.reuters.com/article/idUSL04365487](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL04365487).

Guterres, António. "United Nations Security Council." Received by President of the Security Council, *United Nations Security Council*, United Nations, 12 June 2019, [undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2019/485](http://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2019/485).

Hartzell, Caroline, Mathew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. 2001. "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables." *International Organization* 55 (1):183-208.

"Houthis Announce Release of Hundreds of Prisoners." *Al Jazeera*, Al Jazeera, 30 Sept. 2019, [www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/houthis-announce-release-350-prisoners-almasirah-tv-190930083854096.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/houthis-announce-release-350-prisoners-almasirah-tv-190930083854096.html).

Juneau, Thomas. "No, Yemen's Houthis Actually Aren't Iranian Puppets." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 18 Apr. 2019, [www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/](http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/).

Kalin, Stephen. "Saudi King Urges Action against Iran, Backs Yemen Peace." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 19 Nov. 2018, [www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-king/saudi-king-urges-action-against-iran-backs-yemen-peace-idUSKCN1N01BX](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-king/saudi-king-urges-action-against-iran-backs-yemen-peace-idUSKCN1N01BX).

Kamrava, Mehran. "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy." *Middle East Journal*, vol. 65, no. 4, 2011, pp. 539-556. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/41342739](http://www.jstor.org/stable/41342739).

Mansour, Renad, and Peter Salisbury. *Between Order and Chaos*. Chatham House, 2019, *Between Order and Chaos*, [www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-09-17-](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-09-17-)

[StateTransformationsIraqYemen.pdf](#)

Maoz, Zeev. "The Correlates of War Project." 2016.

Mattes, Michaela and Burcu Savun. 2009. "Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design." *International Studies Quarterly* 53: 737-759.

"Military Expenditure (% of GDP)." *Data*, [data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS).

Nasser, Afrah. "Yemen: Women, War & Political Marginalization." *Atlantic Council*, Atlantic Council, 19 Aug. 2019, [www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/yemen-women-war-political-marginalization](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/yemen-women-war-political-marginalization).

Nilsson, Desirée. "Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Settlements." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 45, no.4, 2008, pp. 479-495 [www.jstor.org/stable/27640711](http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640711).

Palik, Júlia. *Ceasefire Project Country Reports*. Center for Security Studies, 2019, *Ceasefire Project Country Reports*, [css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CPCR\\_Yemen\\_final.pdf](http://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CPCR_Yemen_final.pdf).

"Peace-Building Can Be a Powerful Deterrent to Conflict, Security Council Told." *United Nations*, United Nations, 5 Feb. 2001, [www.un.org/press/en/2001/SC7007.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/press/en/2001/SC7007.doc.htm).

Pearson, Frederic S., and Robert A. Baumann. "International Military Interventions: Identification and Classification." *International Interactions*, vol. 14, no. 2, 1988, pp. 173-180., doi:10.1080/03050628808434701.

“Pity Those Caught in the Middle.” *The Economist*, The Economist Newspaper, 19 Nov. 2009,  
[www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2009/11/19/pity-those-caught-in-the-middle](http://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2009/11/19/pity-those-caught-in-the-middle).

Reiter, Dan. *How Wars End*. Princeton University Press, 2009.

Riedel, Bruce. “Who Are the Houthis, and Why Are We at War with Them?” *Brookings*, Brookings, 18 Dec. 2017, [www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/](http://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/).

Salisbury, Peter. *Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State*. Chatham House, 2016, *Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State*, [www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-05-25-yemen-stemming-rise-of-chaos-state-salisbury.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-05-25-yemen-stemming-rise-of-chaos-state-salisbury.pdf).

Salmoni, Barak A., et al. *Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: the Huthi Phenomenon*. RAND, 2010.

“Saudi Arabia and the UAE Are Gobbling up Yemen.” *The Economist*, The Economist Newspaper, 22 Feb. 2018, [www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/02/22/saudi-arabia-and-the-uae-are-gobbling-up-yemen](http://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/02/22/saudi-arabia-and-the-uae-are-gobbling-up-yemen).

“Saudi-Led Airstrikes in Yemen Kill More Than 60 in Prison, Rebels Say.” *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 1 Sept. 2019, [www.nytimes.com/2019/09/01/world/middleeast/yemen-houthi-saudi-arabia.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/01/world/middleeast/yemen-houthi-saudi-arabia.html).

“Saudi-UAE Unilateral Ceasefire in Yemen Begins; Houthis Balk.” *News / Al Jazeera*, Al Jazeera, 9 Apr. 2020, [www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/saudi-uae-coalition-declares-2-week-unilateral-ceasefire-yemen-200408185013981.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/saudi-uae-coalition-declares-2-week-unilateral-ceasefire-yemen-200408185013981.html).

“Saving the Stockholm Agreement and Averting a Regional Conflagration in Yemen.” *Crisis Group*, 14 Aug. 2019, [www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/203-saving-stockholm-agreement-and-averting-regional-conflagration-yemen](http://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/203-saving-stockholm-agreement-and-averting-regional-conflagration-yemen).

“Separatists' Seizure of Aden Makes Yemen Govt Weaker than Ever.” *France 24*, France 24, 14 Aug. 2019, [www.france24.com/en/20190814-separatists-seizure-of-aden-makes-yemen-govt-weaker-than-ever](http://www.france24.com/en/20190814-separatists-seizure-of-aden-makes-yemen-govt-weaker-than-ever).

Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah and Reed M. Wood. 2017. “Governing Well after War: How Improving Female Representation Prolongs Post-conflict Peace.” *The Journal of Politics* 79(3): 995-1009.

Shaker, Naseh. “Riyadh Agreement Divides Yemenis in Sanaa.” *Al-Monitor*, Al-Monitor, LLC., 17 Nov. 2019, [www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/11/yemen-agreement-saudi-arabia-hadi-separatists-houthis-sanaa.html](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/11/yemen-agreement-saudi-arabia-hadi-separatists-houthis-sanaa.html).

Shanker, Thom, and Robert F. Worth. “Yemen Seizes Sailboat Filled With Weapons, and U.S. Points to Iran.” *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 28 Jan. 2013, [www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/world/middleeast/29military.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/world/middleeast/29military.html?_r=0).

Sharp, Jeremy M. *Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention*. Congressional Research Service, 2019, [fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf).

“Sites of Major Clashes in Aden Between Pro-STC Forces and Pro-Government Troops, August 2019.” *Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies*, Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, 2019.

“Statement Issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait.” *United Nations Security Council*, United Nations, 27 Mar.

2015, [www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2015\\_217.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_217.pdf).

Sudam, Mohamed. "Yemen Rebels Agree to State-Proposed Truce." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 16 June 2007, [www.reuters.com/article/idUSL16515275.CH\\_2400](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL16515275.CH_2400).

Svennson, Isak. 2007. "Mediation with Muscles or Minds? Exploring Power Mediators and Pure Mediators in Civil Wars." *International Negotiation* 12: 229-248.

Transfeld, Mareike. "The UAE Is Weakening Its Partnership with the Saudis in Yemen. Here's Why That Matters." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 28 Aug. 2019, [www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/28/what-saudi-arabia-uaes-changing-partnership-means-future-yemens-war/](http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/28/what-saudi-arabia-uaes-changing-partnership-means-future-yemens-war/).

Transfeld, Mareike. "Yemen's Transition to Political Stability Was Doomed to Fail. Here's Why." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 18 Apr. 2019, [www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/27/yemens-transition-process-was-doomed-to-fail-even-before-the-houthi-takeover/](http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/27/yemens-transition-process-was-doomed-to-fail-even-before-the-houthi-takeover/).

"UNMHA, Hdaydah Agreement." *United Nations*, United Nations, 16 Jan. 2019, [dppa.un.org/en/mission/unmha-hdaydah-agreement](http://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unmha-hdaydah-agreement).

"Victory of Southern Yemen's STC Forces Brings Security to Aden, Say Residents." *Middle East Eye*, 8 Oct. 2018, [www.middleeasteye.net/news/aden-safer-under-control-one-side](http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/aden-safer-under-control-one-side).

"What Is the GCC?" *Al Jazeera*, Al Jazeera, 4 Dec. 2017, [www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/gcc-171204094537378.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/gcc-171204094537378.html).

“The World Bank In Yemen.” *World Bank*, 1 Oct. 2019,

[www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview).

“Yemen Fast Facts.” *CNN*, Cable News Network, 28 Feb. 2020,

[www.cnn.com/2013/07/10/world/meast/yemen-fast-facts/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/10/world/meast/yemen-fast-facts/index.html)

“Yemen's Saudi-Backed Government Rejects UN Troops in Hodeida.” *France 24*, France 24, 10 Dec. 2018,

[www.france24.com/en/20181210-yemen-saudi-backed-government-rejects-un-troops-hodeida-houthis-khashoggi](http://www.france24.com/en/20181210-yemen-saudi-backed-government-rejects-un-troops-hodeida-houthis-khashoggi).

“Yemen Southern Provinces Reject Separatists' Claim to Self-Rule.” *News / Al Jazeera*, Al Jazeera, 26 Apr.

2020, [www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/yemen-southern-provinces-reject-separatists-claim-rule-200426160607212.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/yemen-southern-provinces-reject-separatists-claim-rule-200426160607212.html).

“Yemen's Warring Sides Accuse Each Other of Violating Ceasefire.” *Al Jazeera*, Al Jazeera, 19 Dec. 2018,

[www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/yemen-warring-parties-accuse-violating-ceasefire-181219094050537.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/yemen-warring-parties-accuse-violating-ceasefire-181219094050537.html).

Younes, Ali. “Analysis: The Divergent Saudi-UAE Strategies in Yemen.” *UAE News / Al Jazeera*, Al Jazeera,

31 Aug. 2019, [www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/analysis-divergent-saudi-uae-strategies-yemen-190830121530210.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/analysis-divergent-saudi-uae-strategies-yemen-190830121530210.html).